Imagine for a moment that you are a historian, one hundred
years from the present, seeking to recompose the history of social movements in
the early decades of the 21st century. Imagine for a moment that—due
to some cataclysmic failure of informational storage systems—the entire archive
of texts, images, and videos composed by Occupiers has disappeared, leaving no
trace on the Internet. You would have to go about your historiographical labors
in much the same way as those of us who study historical social movements do.
You would be forced to rely on state archives for basic information about the
movement—archives that are saturated with the paranoid fantasies of the state
agents who composed them. You would be forced to rely upon documents like the recent
trove of FBI papers released upon a FOIA request.
These documents have provoked a great deal of outrage among
erstwhile Occupiers and their sympathizers. Naomi
Wolf writes that the documents show “a terrifying network of coordinated
DHS, FBI, police, regional fusion center, and private-sector activity so
completely merged into one another that the monstrous whole is, in fact, one
entity: in some cases, bearing a single name, the Domestic Security Alliance
Council.” Moreover, the documents “show the cops and DHS working for and with
banks to target, arrest, and politically disable peaceful American citizens.”
Indeed, it is the way in which these documents recode the peacefulness of these “citizens” that is particularly galling to
commentators such as Wolf: these documents—many of which were written before
Occupy actually materialized, when Occupy was only a specter, a movement
to-come—treat Occupy as a potentially violent, radical, even terroristic
movement. The response of Occupiers to this coding has been predictable, and
this response has followed two lines. First, the documents are taken as
evidence that the state works in close coordination with finance capital in
order to ensure the functioning of capitalism, even if this means impinging
upon First Amendment rights. Second, the documents are seen as pure fantasies,
as paranoid misrecognitions of the essence of Occupy. Occupiers, as Wolf writes, were both “peaceful” and “American citizens,” people who comfortably
inhabited a position of political subjectivity that entitled them to the
peaceful exercise of certain rights. In short, responses from Occupiers have
amounted to disidentifications: Within the state archive, Occupy does not
appear as it actually was.
But is this the only way to read this archive—as proof of a
conspiracy, as a misperception of the real? Archives, as
Ann Laura Stoler tells us, are sites of fantasy, realms wherein states
strive to come to terms with the limits of their capacity to know, to determine
and dictate the future. Archives are thus not simply sites of knowledge
production, wherein, say, the FBI would come to know the truth of Occupy. Rather,
archives are formed through the “subjunctive mood of official imaginings,” as
Stoler puts it, and the subjunctive of official imaginings gives access to “the
uneven presence of what was imagined as the possible, the tension between what
was realizable and [what] was romance, between plausible plans and implausible worlds.”
Archives, in short, are saturated with affects and imaginaries, forebodings of
topsy-turvy futures that impinge upon the ways in which state agents give
figure their political present tense.
We who read historical archives for traces of subaltern
resistance frequently have nothing more than these moods, these projected
futures, these “archive romances.” Over time, we’ve become pretty good at
reading—along and against the archival grain—for traces of social movements
caught within the “prose
of counterinsurgency.” Such reading practices always already exceed (or
won’t be able to convince proponents of) a positivist historiographical method,
insofar as these reading practices embed the archive within a field of polemic,
power, and politics; we end up reading the politics of the archive as much as
an archive of politics. I’ve been comfortable with this reading practice for as
long as I can remember—it’s why I study literature, strangely enough. But I
find myself doubting (in good positivist fashion) the adequacy of this
hermeneutic as I read Wolf's disavowal of radicalism, as I read tweets that
bizarrely respond to Occupiers’ archival figuration as militant radicals by
denying that Occupy was ever radical. These doubts assemble themselves in a
series of questions: Is our ability to detect traces of insurgency in the prose
of counterinsurgency simply dependent upon the subalternity of our insurgents?
What, in the end, makes me (as radical historian of “radical” movements)
different from the FBI, ascribing an insurgent force to non-insurgent peoples,
to “peaceful citizens”? Is the only way to make Occupy as radical as it could
have been to systematically eradicate its archive, as I hypothetically did at
the start of this paper? To leave us with nothing but the official imaginings
of paranoid state agents, fucking idiots who (even in these documents!) think
that “black bloc” is a club one can join—but who are also pretty scared of it?
It might be more useful to treat the subjunctive mood of
state archives—a mood that frequently drags in the indicative—as indicating a
potentiality whose existence social actors are themselves but faintly aware of.
The value of the FBI documents doesn’t consist in their evidence of a state
conspiracy, organized at the federal level, to maintain the smooth function of
capitalism against those who would disrupt it. No shit: that’s what the state
does, and the state’s gonna state. (Sidebar: The conspiratorial imagination of
pop leftism and Occupy, as if the awful of capitalism only becomes real when
seven evil dudes meet in a room and hatch evil plans.) Rather, the value of the
FBI documents consists in their recognition of the potential that we had,
perhaps fleetingly, perhaps more enduringly. A sad fact of the left in the U.S.
is that the paranoid fantasies of the right are more leftist than Yankee
leftism. Striking to me in reading these FBI documents is how strong we seemed,
how powerful, how deserving of being feared. The worst possible response to
these documents is to declare, “You crazies! We were never worthy of fear! We
were good peaceful American
citizens!” We need instead to consider how it is that the paranoid fears of the
state always outstrip our capacity to realize revolutionary programs—even when,
as the FBI makes clear, we had that power.
Isn’t the problem that we never became that which a fearful
FBI said we were?