Someone—at least a copy
editor—must have read Emory University president James Wagner’s recent “From
the President” piece in the Emory magazine. Entitled “As
American as…Compromise,” someone must have made sure that everything was
spelled properly, that there were no grammatical solecisms, and so on. Someone
read this piece before it was published, a someone who probably didn’t say, “Hey,
maybe it’s not a good idea to derive a political ethos of compromise from the
U.S. constitutional compromise that counted slaves as three-fifths of a person
in apportioning state representatives. Maybe this history can in no way justify
your desire to defund the liberal arts.” Maybe he or she couldn’t speak up—an
editor or employee at a university PR office doesn’t have quite the same amount
of power or clout as the president, of course. Or maybe he or she didn’t have
any problems with Wagner’s choice of examples. Maybe he or she thought Wagner’s
piece showed the serviceability of U.S. history for our political present—a time
when money is scarce, after all, and decisions about value have to be made.
Whatever the case, we know that Wagner’s zany, crazy use of a fraught example
did not leap immediately and transparently from his brain to the page. Rather,
Wagner’s piece was the product of multiple forms of collaboration, of
socialized symbolic production—from the Emory homecoming panel wherein an
anonymously and indirectly cited “distinguished” alum first suggests the
exemplarity of the three-fifths compromise to the less distinguished,
less-well-paid editor or PR employee whose eyes scanned the release for errors
and did not note the most glaring error on the page. We too are now Wagner’s collaborators, debating
the merits of his choice of examples, snarking about him on Facebook and
Twitter, and writing
fantastic blog posts about the ideological blockages structuring the
compromise in historical fact and as contemporary example. We too now
participate in the social production of the exemplary. Exemplarity, then, is
not a status objectively present in historical events, persons, or things. “So
far no chemist,” Marx writes, “has ever discovered exchange value either in a
pearl or a diamond.” Neither will the chemist—or historian, for that matter—discover
the “example value” of an historical object in the object itself. Such value is
produced by and circulates through diffuse social networks of institutions and
discourses.
It’s the diffuse and social
nature of the production of the exemplary that accounts for the rapid and voluminous
responses to Wagner’s comments. Over the past few years, but reaching a fever
pitch in 2012/13, Yankees have increasingly dedicated themselves to the
proposition that the antebellum period possesses unique explanatory power for
the political dynamics of our present. We shouldn’t be misled into thinking
that the antebellum period always and naturally exists as a symbolic repertoire
for getting a handle on our present. Bush-era U.S.A. was not so invested in the
exemplarity and symbolic power of the antebellum. Certainly Bush paid the
requisite homage to Lincoln and whatever, but the symbolic dominant and the
primary axis of allegoresis was theological in orientation. Indeed, Bruce
Holsinger argues that Bush-era symbolics amounted to a form of “neomedievalism,”
wherein the present became legible through cultural codes derived from some
imagined medieval world (“crusades,” for instance, or the emergent interest in
feudal sovereignty as a mode of thinking states in a globalized world). Just a
few years later, we have come to inhabit a new symbolic and discursive formation,
one that we might call “antebellism.” Antebellism equips its advocates—from
Barack Obama to Steven Spielberg to your uncle who is currently wading through Team of Rivals—with an allegory with
which to map the political constellation of the present. My point here is that
if Wagner’s choice of example was in some fashion inevitable (and I’ll make
this case indirectly), so too was a quick and voluminous response. We’re all
keyed into the antebellist register. We have all—right and left—formed a
discursive compromise to think the present through the examples and symbols
afforded by antebellum history.
Antebellism is a product of,
and a hermeneutic for, the U.S.’s political present. For this reason,
antebellism is less fascinating for the historical analogy it assembles—an
analogy that is, as Wagner exemplarily demonstrates, of dubious historiographical
merit—than for how it symptomatizes the way that subjects today think and feel
their relationship to the political. Let’s stick with Wagner’s example: the
morbidly humorous thing about the history of the compromise is that, well, it
did not really work. (It couldn’t, of course, and not for parliamentary or
constitutional reasons; the slaves themselves would see to it that every
compromise with their own power would fail.) The compromise didn’t contain the
antagonism that forced it into existence; rather, the inaugural compromise only
ensured that more compromises would come, each more ineffective than the last
until, ultimately, the social exploded into war. Any invocation of compromise
invokes the haunting fact of its failure, just as, and more broadly, the
discursive formation of antebellism situates us in a moment just prior to a war
that cannot but arrive. So, how is the world so structured that subjects come
to know and feel themselves as political only within the horizon of total
catastrophe? What kind of work does this affectively charged imaginary perform?
Antebellism finds its
conditions of possibility in the routinized crisis marked by the intertwined
processes of neoliberalism and globalization. It provides a dramatic existential
hermeneutic by which U.S. subjects can come to grips with the permanent, low
intensity, non-dramatic crises of everyday life in a world abandoned to market
rationality. Think about Wagner: he invokes the compromise so as to invest the
market-based rationale for defunding the humanities with a gleaming symbolic
value. Fair enough: you might object that that’s just ideological obfuscation.
But why have we—a non-presidential we, rulers of neither universities nor
nation-states—come to counter-invest in these symbolics? I want to suggest
that, through the antebellist allegory, U.S. subjects can imagine their
accumulating, low intensity misery as turning into something—a punctual, cataclysmic, dramatic crisis. The alternative—that
is, this world, the real world, the one wherein the accumulation of misery has
not transmuted into qualitative transformation, the one wherein the permanent
crisis of neoliberalism is lived non-dramatically—is too much to bear. Antebellism
confronts the crisis of living without a dramatic crisis, of surviving life
subsumed into the biopolitical calculations of neoliberal accountancy, of
inhabiting a hum-drum world where accountants rule the roost and wherein
politics consists in choosing the best bean counter. In so doing, antebellism
transmutes everything being fought over into something worth fighting for:
voting for Obama becomes electing another Lincoln, cutting funding becomes a
constitutional compromise. The extraterrestrial world of high governance is
brought down to earth, a battlefield, and each man must do his part. Politics
becomes a felt, tactile, intimate experience at the moment that it is imagined
before the war, in the horizon of possible bodily undoing, of death. By routing
contemporary politics through an affectively charged (if vaguely grasped)
historical grid, antebellism domesticates—even as it aggrandizes—the arcane
antagonisms structuring contemporary political disputation. Backdoor deals between
congressional leaders, gentlemen’s agreements between Wall Street and the White
House, the defunding of the humanities…the messy, ignoble stuff of neoliberal
governance comes to light and comes to order in the clearing of antebellism’s
projected battlefield. Everything gleams with a significant simplicity.
Antebellism amounts to a kind of vernacular Schmittianism: it resituates the
apolitical world of neoliberal governance in an antagonistic field constituted
by the properly political distinction of “friend” and “enemy.” Line drawn, we’re
poised just moments before the inauguration of hostilities. But, alas, we’re
never supposed to fight it out. The specter of civil war simply drives us back
into the arms of collapsing institutions and a state whose democratic deficit
tracks its budgetary shortfalls. Antebellism produced that bizarre discursive
world wherein neosecessionists
tried separating from the U.S. by petitioning Obama…
Ultimately, antebellism
gears us up for political war only to tell us that the battle has already been
decided—there’s no longer any politics, no longer any open struggle through
which the future will be decided. Instead, we’re invited to invest political
meaning in the technologies of neoliberal governance, in what Wagner calls “the
rich tools of compromise.” We need to read Wagner’s choice of example, then, as
the end result of an attempt to derive a political feeling from the withdrawal
of the political. Ultimately, that’s what all antebellism does: it allows us to
feel political even as we abandon the political—or, rather, even as the
political abandons us. “Compromise” both names this withdrawal of the political
and invests our acquiescence to it with a pseudo-political affect. It does not
so much describe a peaceful, pacifying working relationship between willful and
opposed political subjects (Republicans and Democrats, say, or partisans of the
humanities and the sciences) as it does the conformation of varied and
antagonistic political wills to an exorbitant, apolitical logic (i.e.,
neoliberal capitalism). We don’t compromise so much as our possibility for
political action has been compromised. It is our recognition of the compromised
nature of any political action that is supposed to subtend all contemporary
politics—indeed, it’s supposed to pass as
politics. [Edit: please note that in Wagner's non-apology, he writes, " Inevitably, our existence as human beings is a compromised existence, never pure." Yep.]
How, then, to respond? Almost
any form of response to Wagner’s example will amount to a form of collaboration—a
(re)production and circulation of the cultural logic through which
neoliberalism attempts securing acquiescence to the withdrawal of the
political. No doubt this circulation cannot be stopped by fiat or through
simple demystification. No doubt antebellism is an ideology, one that imagines
our relation to the real in mystified and mystifying ways, but this imaginary
is secured by an intensely felt sincerity that sutures subjects to its terms,
and I’m not sure that ideology critique is adequate to undoing this suturing.
We might be left with antebellism as a cultural allegory until some event
displaces it and induces the production of new forms of pop political
sense-making. I think that the minimum that we can do—and this might be a
maximal minimum—is to de-naturalize the use of antebellum examples and symbols
in the name of a tactical de-dramatization. We need to insistently demonstrate
that it isn’t necessary to turn to the antebellum to think our present, show
that other symbolic resources are available, and so produce a
self-consciousness about the motivations that lead us to think and experience
according to a given protocol. The question “Is this exemplary history really
adequate to this contemporary case?” can be usefully deflationary. And we need to deflate the symbolics through
which neoliberal governance attempts dramatizing and inducing particular felt
relations to the non-drama of governed life. We need to be able to say, “Um,
hey, prez, you’re talking about budget cuts for university departments—not
founding a state and collaborating in the eventual enslavement of millions of
people. Drama much? Chill out.” Why? On one hand, and as I’ve suggested, this
conduction of affect to the flattish world of budgets and accountancy allows us
to feel as political something that is being structured as apolitical. On the other hand, over-dramatizing aspects
of governance like budgets allows us to ignore the lower grade but very real
dramas that can flare up around these
ways of making and remaking our worlds. Neoliberal life is filled with plenty
of crises, low grade as they are, that have a density particular to themselves—a
liberal arts grad student at Emory not getting a sixth year of funding, for
instance, or a post-doc not turning into a job line because of fiscal cuts. Not
as important or dramatic as nations being formed, slavery legitimated, or
Africans dehumanized, but certainly crises possessing a drama and import of
their own. Let’s just talk about those dramas.
This piece is fantastic. Thank you. As a member of the Emory community, I think this piece names and diagnoses our current situation superbly.
ReplyDeleteOne thing that occurs to me to add here is that Wagner is also very fond of drawing on the civil rights movement as a go-to discursive template. Here's audio of him responding to a plangent student question about the cuts by comparing his leadership to that of the Civil Rights movement: http://gonepublic.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/wagner-10-30-12.mp3 - the relevant segment starts at 38 minutes.
He has also not hesitated to marry the rhetoric of civil rights leadership with the deployment of force against students - on his watch, students protesting the exploitation of Emory workers were arrested and jailed, and deployed armed police and locked down buildings during a recent negotiation between him and student representatives. You can read the transcript of that meeting here: http://stopthecutsemory.com/2012/12/12/notes-from-negotiations-with-wagner-forman-and-hauk/